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Abstract
Trade friction today is largely due to regulatory diversity 
as contemporary markets are chiefly segmented through 
non-tariff barriers. The purpose of the paper is to enquire 
into regulatory cooperation and coherence in the context 
of the world trade regime. It examines the challenges 
arising from regulatory diversity and considers mechanisms 
and approaches that could be taken to reduce regulatory 
barriers and costs to trade. Following an assessment of 
how countries are currently pursuing regulatory cooperation 
in the context of preferential, plurilateral and multilateral 
initiatives, with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
under the aegis of the WTO adopted as the baseline, a set 
of options for policies and international trade rules that will 
enhance regulatory cooperation are put forward. The main 
recommendations concern transparency in the formulation 
of policies, the interaction between affected parties when 
preparing and adopting regulatory measures that could 
impact on trade, and the establishment of fora where 
these discussions and commitments may take place. The 
options are divided into two categories: institutional and 
substantive. The former is dedicated to issues attendant to 
participation, while the latter is concerned with improving 
existing obligations and developing new mechanisms for 
cooperation. The paper acknowledges that developing 
countries with a limited administrative apparatus may 
find some of the options difficult to implement, and thus 
underscores the need for capacity building. It concludes that 
a mechanism of “reasoned transparency” will bring the trade 
and regulatory communities together, which should become 
one of the pillars of the WTO. The organization should add a 
function akin to an Information Exchange regime covering all 
forms of regulatory cooperation.
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Executive Summary
The focus of the paper is on regulatory cooperation 
and regulatory coherence in the context of the world 
trading system. The intensity of cooperation can vary. 
On one end of the continuum it could be an agreement 
to talk and on the other it could lead to the recognition of 
regulatory processes as equivalent. The key questions are: 
why promote either or both regulatory cooperation and 
coherence, and what are the mechanisms that can best 
help ease the tensions resulting from the expression of 
asymmetric domestic policies?
To address these issues, ICTSD, in partnership with the 
World Economic Forum, convened a group of experts, 
as part of the E15Initiative. The European University 
Institute joined forces in this endeavour. The mandate 
was to propose solutions to improve the world trade 
regime. A bottom-up approach was privileged to identify 
specific areas where problems have arisen due to a lack 
of cooperation and also evaluate existing mandates on 
regulatory cooperation in the WTO and in preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs). The resulting assessment of the 
distance between present and desired levels of cooperation 
provides the basis on which the policy options are outlined. 
Two aspects of this work deserve to be underlined. First, 
cooperation involves the gathering of two communities that 
have rarely communicated with each other in the past: the 
trade and the regulatory community. A guiding principle 
has been to advance proposals that aim to bridge this gap. 
Second, developing countries may find some of the options 
difficult to implement. The need for capacity building is thus 
underscored, most prominently under the Aid for Trade (AfT) 
initiative.
Regulatory Cooperation: Where are we now?
The aim is to provide input to the WTO regarding the 
manner in which it could better serve its current and 
anticipated workload. This trade perspective is not 
exhausted within the confines of the WTO regime. There 
are many initiatives focusing on regulatory cooperation that 
take place outside of the WTO, either formally within PTAs 
or informally. As can be expected, there is much more 
activity and intensity at the PTA level. The baseline adopted 
in the paper is cooperation in the context of two multilateral 
agreements: the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Measures. These are the most far-reaching examples 
of regulatory cooperation in the WTO.
Regulatory cooperation in the GATT
In the GATT world, disciplines on regulatory barriers were 
mainly intended to ensure that tariff reductions would not be 
circumvented through the substitution of policy instruments. 
Following the founding of the WTO and the declining role of 
tariffs, commitments on regulatory barriers have a different 
function: they are market-integrating devices. The basic 
recipe under the GATT for addressing non-tariff barriers is 
non-discrimination. Non-discrimination conditions market 
access on the capacity of products to meet standards 
unilaterally decided by an importing state. It has nothing to 
say about the quality of the regulatory intervention, nor on 
regulatory diversity.
Regulatory cooperation in the WTO
The WTO contract allows for new avenues to integrate 
beyond non-discrimination. The TBT and SPS Agreements 
provide a mix of disciplines that promote recognition of the 
impact that the unilateral exercise of regulatory authority 
may entail. The WTO, through the disciplines imposed 
by these agreements, addresses the quality of regulatory 
intervention. Moreover, members are not free to adopt any 
measure they deem appropriate as long as it is applied non-
discriminatorily. The TBT and SPS Agreements, which cover 
a subset of regulatory activity dealing with issues of public 
health, consumer protection, environmental protection, 
etc., do not require from WTO members that they adopt 
first best policies. They do oblige them, nonetheless, to 
adopt measures that have the least impact on trade, that 
are non-discriminatory, and where transparency has been 
observed. They have not resulted in eliminating trade costs. 
The unilateral definition of policies continues to be the 
mainstream scenario—cooperation being relegated to best 
endeavours.
Regulatory cooperation within preferential trade agreements
While PTAs originally addressed classic trade barriers, 
they have evolved into mechanisms that seek to promote 
regulatory cooperation, which can be achieved with greater 
ease between a subset of the WTO membership. The 
most far-reaching examples of cooperation are between 
homogeneous players. They are not exclusively between 
such players however: homogeneity is a facilitating factor. 
Regulatory cooperation between heterogeneous players is 
often more targeted on specific product categories.
Clubs with open doors
WTO plurilateral agreements constitute another club 
approach to integration. Plurilaterals can be formed by 
a subset of the WTO membership, provided that the 
remaining WTO members have acquiesced to a demand 
to this effect. There is thus some ex ante control on their 
7Regulatory Coherence
subject matter. Their practical relevance so far has been 
limited to the liberalization of the government procurement 
market. In addition, critical mass agreements constitute a 
negotiating technique to reduce the impact of free riding. 
Unlike plurilaterals, they have no institutional underpinning in 
the Agreement establishing the WTO. 
Policy Options: From Current to Desired 
Cooperation
The options concern transparency in the formulation of 
policies, the interaction between affected parties when 
preparing and adopting measures, and the establishment of 
fora for discussion. When proposing policies, there is often 
a trade-off between ambition and realism, and a guiding 
principle has been to maximize both values to the extent 
feasible. The options are as close as possible to a first best 
solution having evaluated alternatives. They are divided 
into institutional and substantive categories. The former are 
dedicated to issues of participation. The latter concern the 
improvement of existing obligations and mechanisms for 
cooperation.
Institutional recommendations
Clubs – Promote recourse to plurilateral agreements
The WTO should actively promote regulatory cooperation 
within clubs and develop mechanisms that enable 
the multilateralization of clubs-only agreements. The 
establishment of plurilateral agreements should be 
sanctioned unless WTO members representing a combined 
threshold of world trade (e.g. 20%) are opposed. The WTO 
should particularly encourage plurilaterals that deal with 
issues that do not come under the existing mandate.
Business Access – The WTO should open to business 
interests
Business interests should be in a position to continue 
voicing their concerns. Participation should be encouraged 
and requests for observer status should not be refused 
except for compelling reasons to be transparently 
communicated. In designing this observer status, the WTO 
could be inspired by the Industry Advisory Committee of the 
OECD or the Business Advisory Council of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation. Representation should not be 
confined to areas covered by the TBT and SPS Agreements.
Substantive recommendations
Transparency – Strengthen and consolidate transparency 
disciplines
The current transparency obligation must be consolidated 
and strengthened in five directions: (i) there should be a 
“mapping” of national mechanisms that are intended to 
provide transparency with respect to national regulatory 
processes; (ii) WTO members should notify all adopted 
measures, whether based on international standards or not; 
(iii) they should explain the rationale behind their measures 
(“reasoned transparency”); (iv) they should involve affected 
parties at an early stage in the process; (v) they should use 
the reasonable interval between publication and entry into 
force of a measure to fine-tune regulation.
Impact assessment – Conduct ex post evaluations of the 
impact of adopted measures
The original ex ante assessment of the impact of a 
proposed regulation should be accompanied by an 
ex post assessment of the trade impact of adopted 
measures. To the extent that discrepancies between the 
expected outcome and the observed impact exist, national 
administrations could revise their a priori assumptions so as 
to design more efficient regulations in the future.
International standards – Recourse to international 
standards should be encouraged
Article 2.4 of TBT could be further strengthened. Besides 
encouraging the use of international standards in principle, 
it could make it clear that deviations from international 
standards should be justified by the deviating state. The 
same provision should be enriched in two ways: through 
an explicit reference of the 2000 Decision and through 
the addition of an indicative list of standard-setting 
organizations.
Private Standards – Clarify the relevance of the WTO on 
private standards
The WTO should dedicate a forum to the issue. It could be 
inspired by prior endeavours such as the 1971 Working 
Party on Border Tax Adjustments. Instead of continuing 
along the current top-down approach, it would be more 
opportune to dedicate to sector-specific negotiations.
Next Steps
An appropriate way to rationalize the quality of regulatory 
interventions at home is by looking at the best examples 
elsewhere and mimic them. Reasoned transparency should 
become a priority. It is through this mechanism that the 
trade and the regulatory communities will be brought around 
the same table, which should become one of the pillars of 
the WTO. All the proposals seek to further an institutional 
innovation that would promote regulatory cooperation 
across the WTO membership on a sustainable basis. The 
paper encourages the current initiatives undertaken in the 
context of the TBT and SPS Committees. They should be 
improved and also reproduced in other areas. Alternatively, 
the WTO could envisage establishing a Working Group on 
Transparency where all the options could find a home for 
deliberation. The organization should add a function akin to 
an Information Exchange regime for all forms of regulatory 
cooperation.
8 Policy Options for a Sustainable Global Trade and Investment System
1. Introduction Remarks
1.1. Mandate
The focus of this paper is on “regulatory cooperation” 
and “regulatory coherence.” Neither of these two terms is 
prone to a very precise definition, and the contexts in which 
they are, or have been, used matters. During the ongoing 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations between the European Union and the United 
States, for example, the two terms have been defined as 
follows (US Chamber of Commerce 2015).
 
‘Regulatory cooperation’ is the process of interaction 
between U.S. and EU regulators, founded on the 
benefits regulators can achieve through closer 
partnership and greater regulatory interoperability.
‘Regulatory coherence’ is about good regulatory 
practices, transparency, and stakeholder engagement in 
a domestic regulatory process.
Thus, whereas the first term would denote the presence 
of an international element, the second term describes 
the quality of a domestic regulatory process. Of course, 
domestic regulatory processes are influenced by the 
quantity and quality of regulatory cooperation.
We understand the number of players involved as the 
“extensive margin” of regulatory cooperation, and the 
intensity of cooperation as the “intensive margin.”  WTO 2.0 
should be some sort of information exchange regime about 
all forms of regulatory cooperation happening between clubs 
(and the whole membership, whenever feasible). It should 
further develop criteria for selecting issues of cooperation 
that can move from the club to the multilateral level.
The intensity of cooperation can obviously vary. On one end 
of the continuum it could be an agreement to talk, and on 
the other it could lead to the adoption of common standards 
and/or recognition of each other’s regulatory processes 
as equivalent. And then there are variations of these forms 
as well. OECD (2013), to which we refer in more detail 
infra, provides an inventory of various types of cooperation 
and distinguishes between eleven categories of different 
intensity.  
The key question is why promote either or both regulatory 
cooperation and coherence? In response, these are 
instruments that can help ease the tensions resulting from 
the expression of asymmetric policies (Hoekman (2015) 
offers a comprehensive discussion). The objective matters 
though. It is one thing to promote regulatory cooperation in 
order to address an environmental hazard. It is a different 
thing to do so in order to integrate markets. 
The E15 Task Force was mandated to enquire into 
regulatory cooperation/coherence in the context of the 
world trade regime. The primary focus was to enquire into 
the problems in integrating markets posed by the current 
state of cooperation, and propose solutions to improve 
the regime. An attempt has nonetheless been made to 
expand the scope of the paper in such a way that (some 
of) the lessons learned from the study of the world trade 
regime can be extrapolated in other areas where regulatory 
cooperation/coherence can help achieve gains for global 
welfare.
1.2. Scope
The issues this policy options paper seeks to address focus 
on the world trade regime (i.e. the WTO and the various 
preferential trade agreements or PTAs). How is market 
integration impeded (or, alternatively, how can it further be 
aided) through the current state of regulatory cooperation 
across trading nations? What are, in other words, the 
costs resulting from the existing level of cooperation on 
the regulatory front? The paper seeks to identify the most 
appropriate existing mechanisms for addressing them, as 
well as preferred approaches to do so.    
Contemporary markets are segmented essentially through 
regulatory, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), following the GATT’s 
success in dismantling tariff barriers. Trade friction is largely 
due to regulatory diversity. Indeed, the very high number 
of specific trade concerns (STCs) raised so far before the 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee is probably 
the best evidence to this effect: 460 had been raised by 
July 2015.1 Some might argue then, why cooperate? 
Indeed, would it not be more efficient to simply litigate 
instead of delving into the intricacies, often byzantine, of 
regulatory cooperation with players the internal politics of 
which are often impossible to influence? Litigation is costly 
and sometimes inaccessible too. STCs do promise fast 
1 See, http://tbtims.wto.org. Five of them became “formal disputes” that were raised under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Five might seem 
too low. Claims under the TBT Agreement have been raised in 50 disputes so far, but in only five cases the main concern was a TBT concern. Related 
numbers for the SPS Agreement are comparable (275/43/10).
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relief, but if stakes are high, the defendant might stall and 
oblige plaintiffs to submit formal disputes to Panels and the 
Appellate Body. The average length of the formal process 
is bordering on 5 years. Moreover, only WTO members can 
access a WTO Panel. This means that business will have to 
persuade a government to litigate. Governments, however, 
are sums of interests and might on occasion find it profitable 
to thwart such requests. Recourse to litigation before 
domestic courts is also improbable, since WTO members 
typically do not allow private parties to invoke WTO law 
before domestic courts except for customs-related issues 
(WTO law is not “self executing” in US parlance; has no 
“direct effect” in EU parlance).2
The baseline is regulatory cooperation in the context 
of two WTO agreements: the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). These are the most far-
reaching examples of cooperation in the WTO. The issue 
of regulatory cooperation has also occupied the minds of 
trade negotiators in the context of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS); Article VI of GATS deals with 
disciplines on domestic regulation regarding qualification, 
technical specifications, etc. for services and service 
suppliers. There is an ongoing discussion regarding 
regulatory cooperation in this context in order to reduce 
costs stemming from unilateral regulation. At the time of 
writing, this process was far from producing sufficiently 
tangible results that could inspire the present study or 
recommendations.3 Our final recommendations though, are 
not limited to trade in goods, or to the future design of the 
TBT Agreement for that matter. The policy options that we 
advance in this paper could find application in other areas 
of regulatory cooperation. Adjustments might be warranted, 
but the gist of our proposals is in principle applicable in 
areas beyond trade in goods.
1.3. Recommendations
TBT and SPS evidently cover a subset of regulatory activity, 
albeit an important one, since they deal with issues of public 
health, environmental protection, food safety, consumer 
protection, the fight against fraudulent practices, etc. These 
agreements do not require from WTO members that they 
adopt first best policies when aiming to achieve one of the 
objectives mentioned above. By first best, we understand 
optimal policies that are targeted and eliminate distortions. 
The second best theory suggests that when one optimality 
condition is not met, a (second best) policy that introduces 
some new market distortion might still be efficient if it 
removes in part the original distortion. The TBT and SPS 
Agreements do oblige WTO members, nonetheless, to 
adopt policies that have the least impact on international 
trade, that are non-discriminatory and that, on occasion, 
are consistent and based on science. Alas, they have not 
2 This has been the case for some time now. An early contribution on this subject concerning EU practice is offered by Vermulst and Waer (1997).
3 Negotiators have agreed to elaborate new disciplines, see WTO Docs. S/C/W/96, and S/WPDR/W/45. Mattoo (2015) has also studied the role of 
regulatory cooperation in services agreements.  He argues that current regulatory disciplines in the GATS point in the right direction but are insufficient.
resulted in eliminating trade costs, in part because they 
are not always faithfully implemented, and in part because 
the unilateral definition of policies continues to be the 
mainstream scenario in the WTO world—cooperation being 
relegated to best endeavours.
A question that occupied the Task Force concerned the 
degree of ambition when tackling the issue of regulatory 
cooperation/coherence. One could think of various options 
here: cooperation could aim at persuading every WTO 
member to adopt first best policies; it could be restricted 
to mimicking the most promising example between trading 
partners in place, even if it has been agreed by a subset of 
the WTO membership only; and it could also be some sort 
of incremental improvement on current WTO practices. If, 
for example, environmental labelling is proven to adequately 
inform consumers about potential environmental hazards 
(under assumptions, of course), why have recourse to other 
more drastic (and probably less efficient) instruments such 
as import embargoes or other measures?
Policy proposals can be helpful only when immunized with 
a heavy dose of realism. There is, of course, a trade-off 
between ambition and realism, and a guiding principle of 
this paper and the process behind it has been to attempt to 
maximize both values to the extent feasible. 
The policies that are thus proposed are as close as possible 
to a first best solution, having evaluated the pros and cons 
of alternatives in case a proposal could be deemed too 
ambitious. 
Four different sources have inspired the Task Force in 
preparing a recipe for forward momentum and the design of 
cooperation for the trading community: The current state of 
affairs in the WTO and PTAs, paying particular attention to 
the most ambitious forms of cooperation embedded therein; 
the concerns and sources of discontent of the export-
oriented business community; the analysis and experience 
of organizations and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) dealing with trade as well as regulatory cooperation; 
and academic writings, both on the policy side as well as 
theoretical enquiries.
One aspect of this work deserves to be underlined. In 
today’s world, cooperation involves the gathering of two 
communities that rarely communicated with each other in 
the past: the trade and the regulatory community. The issue 
is as much of international as it is of domestic scope. A 
guiding principle throughout has been to advance proposals 
that aim to bridge the gap between these communities 
that operate insulated from each other in many domestic 
settings.
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It is impossible to provide a generic estimation of the 
potential gains from regulatory cooperation. It all depends 
on the product market and the form cooperation will take. 
Some markets are heavily regulated, with no cooperation 
at all, and some are the exact opposite. There are various 
studies that have focused on this issue and sought to 
provide evaluations of the gains. The OECD has been a 
pioneer in this endeavour.4 
With all of this in mind, the recommendations presented 
in this paper aim to address both the unilateral expression 
of regulatory concerns as well as cooperation on this 
front. One might criticize the inclusion of the former in a 
study aiming to address regulatory “cooperation.” And yet, 
such criticism is unwarranted. Imposing disciplines on the 
unilateral exercise of regulatory sovereignty can lead to 
cooperative outcomes, as shall be shown.
The main recommendations concern transparency in the 
formulation of policies, the interaction between affected 
parties when preparing and adopting measures, and the 
establishment of fora where these discussions can take 
place. 
Finally, an issue that is crucial for many of the 
recommendations should be noted. The world comprises 
heterogeneous players of drastically different administrative 
capacities. Developing countries especially might find it 
difficult to implement some of the policy options, such 
as, for example, the measurement of the trade impact of 
regulations or the use of some international standards. For 
this reason, it is important to underscore upfront the need 
for capacity building and the ensuing supply of technical 
expertise by those who possess it to those who do not. 
Existing WTO regimes scattered in various agreements, 
most prominently the Aid for Trade initiative, can facilitate 
this effort.
4 The OECD webpage (www.oecd.org) includes various studies on the gains from regulatory cooperation
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Regulatory cooperation is being pursued both at the 
multilateral and preferential level. PTAs increasingly include 
chapters that cover aspects of the issue. As can be 
expected, there is much more activity and intensity at the 
PTA level, especially when PTAs have been concluded 
between homogeneous players. 
2.1. Regulatory Cooperation in the GATT
Regulatory cooperation was not much of a concern for the 
framers of the GATT, who had other, bigger fish to fry. In 
the GATT world, commitments on regulatory barriers were 
intended to provide an insurance policy that tariff reductions 
would not be circumvented through the substitution of policy 
instruments.5 In a world where tariffs become increasingly 
marginal, commitments on regulatory barriers have a 
different function: they are market-integrating devices. The 
most dramatic reduction in tariff levels coincided with the 
advent of the WTO. It is thus after 1995 that the focus 
shifted towards regulatory cooperation. Some discussion on 
regulatory cooperation had already started during the GATT 
Tokyo Round (1973-1979), with the advent of the first TBT 
Agreement. It is there that the first, shy steps in this direction 
were taken. This effort, though, was confined to the OECD 
membership, since the Tokyo Round agreements were a 
“code” in the sense that participation was voluntary. Only 
OECD members joined.
   
How did the GATT address regulatory barriers in general, 
that is, those that did not come under the Tokyo Round 
TBT Agreement? The basic recipe under the GATT for 
addressing NTBs is non-discrimination. Non-discrimination 
conditions market access upon the capacity of products 
to meet standards unilaterally decided by the importing 
state. If not, they will be excluded from that market. Non-
discrimination has nothing to say about the “quality” of 
the regulatory intervention: trading regulations can be 
“excessive,” that is they might go beyond what is required 
to achieve the aim pursued, and thus, they can impose 
huge costs on trading nations. They will still comply with the 
basic GATT rule, however. Furthermore, non-discrimination 
condones regulatory diversity and is an insurance policy for 
those with high levels of protection: they can thwart imports 
that do not meet their standards.
2.2. Regulatory Cooperation in the WTO
Beyond non-discrimination, the WTO contract allows for 
other more “promising” ways to integrate. The so-called 
“new generation” agreements, the TBT and the SPS, 
provide a mix of disciplines that promote recognition of the 
(negative) impact that the unilateral exercise of regulatory 
authority might entail.6 With the advent of the WTO, the TBT 
Agreement was multilateralized and the first SPS Agreement 
was signed. Unlike the GATT, the WTO, through the 
disciplines imposed by these two agreements, addresses 
the quality of regulatory intervention, and, also unlike the 
GATT, it does not leave it to its members to decide and 
adopt whatever measure they deem appropriate as long as 
they apply it in non-discriminatory manner.
For measures coming under the purview of these two 
agreements, when WTO members act unilaterally they 
must adopt the measure least restrictive on international 
trade, and must base it on international standards if the 
latter are relevant and appropriate. They must ensure that 
transparency has been observed. They must also allow 
intervals between the publication of measures and their 
entry into force, during which they can accommodate 
questions regarding the policy rationale and objectives. 
WTO members can also unilaterally recognize other 
members’ measures as equivalent to their own. They are 
further encouraged to rethink the merits of their intervention, 
assess the impact, and explore alternatives before deciding 
on the final measure, all of this under a recent initiative 
entitled Good Regulatory Practice (GRP).7  With respect 
to SPS measures only, WTO procedures must further 
guarantee that interventions are based on available scientific 
evidence and are consistent when addressing similar risks. 
WTO members are encouraged to sign mutual recognition 
agreements (MRAs) and/or harmonize their rules. 
The fact is, though, that recognition agreements are 
routinely signed between like-minded, homogeneous players 
(often in the context of PTAs), and few participants prepare 
harmonized standards for the world. Non-discrimination 
remains largely the baseline for integration at the WTO-level 
among the majority of WTO members.
2. Regulatory Cooperation: 
Where Are We Now?
5 A customs duty can be expressed as the sum of a production subsidy and a consumption tax. A discipline on customs duties with no corresponding 
discipline on the other two instruments could thus prove meaningless.
6 TBT covers measures relating to the obligation of producers to indicate the composition and/or production process of their goods, whether they revert to 
the form of labelling/packaging or not. SPS covers measures aimed to protect human, animal health, and/or the environment from pests and diseases.
7 This is an initiative that has been adopted recently and urges WTO members to adopt policies that best address perceived distortions. The WTO has 
been investing resources to increase technical capacity in this respect. See 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/wkshop_march08_e/wkshop_march08_e.htm
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2.3. Regulatory Cooperation within Preferential Trade 
Agreements
If we exclude cooperation in the EU, all intra-PTA 
cooperation takes place within free trade agreements (FTAs), 
which occasionally include chapters to this effect. FTAs are 
closed clubs—i.e. conditions for accession for outsiders are 
not spelt out ex ante. Accession depends on agreement 
with the incumbents. 
The most far-reaching examples for regulatory cooperation 
are between homogeneous players. This is not to say that 
they are exclusively between such players. Homogeneity is a 
facilitating factor, not a conditio sine qua non. 
Originally, PTAs addressed classic trade barriers, e.g. tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions. Eventually, they evolved into 
mechanisms that promote regulatory cooperation, which 
can be achieved with greater ease between a subset of the 
WTO membership. 
The US and Canada have been partners in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for over twenty 
years, and bilateral partners for even longer (the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement, or CUSFTA, predates 
NAFTA). Besides cooperation under NAFTA, they have 
established their own Canada-United States Regulatory 
Cooperation Council (RCC). The accounts regarding its 
overall record are consistently positive, and there is ample 
evidence to the effect that the RCC is quite active in 
discussing standards, but also in reducing or eliminating 
friction resulting from regulatory divergence (Wolfe 2014).
New Zealand and Australia first signed the Australia-New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA), and then entered into a wide MRA, the 
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement (TTMRA). 
As illustration, it is worth mentioning a notable output of 
this initiative, the Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
(FSANZ). It focuses on cooperation in the preparation of 
food at an early stage (i.e. not subsequent to the adoption 
of national laws), and in measuring the trade impact of 
proposed measures. It is acknowledged that the initiative 
has largely contributed to the strengthening of economic 
relations between the two countries.8
Then there are examples of more recent PTAs that have 
mainly focused on regulatory cooperation. Take the case 
of transatlantic relations. The transatlantic partners, who 
are currently engaged in the TTIP negotiations, have a 
long history of regulatory cooperation: the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership (1998); the EU/US Positive Economic 
Agenda (2002); the EU/US Economic Initiative (2005); 
and the Framework for Enhancing Transatlantic Economic 
Integration (2007). In parallel, there is an informal business 
dialogue, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD),9 
and the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD). There is 
consensus that these initiatives, formal and informal, have 
led to few changes on the regulatory front on either side of 
the Atlantic, but have substantially contributed in reducing 
trade friction.10 Moreover, they may have contributed 
towards the initiation of the TTIP negotiation, the formal 
“roof” to host and further promote all of these initiatives.  
Regulatory cooperation also exists between heterogeneous 
players. However, it is often more targeted. Negotiators 
discuss specific product categories and aim to reach 
solutions and build on prior success. A good example is 
the EU-China Regulatory Cooperation Framework. It is an 
initiative between government entities focusing on product 
safety. The Rapid Alert System for non-food dangerous 
products (RAPEX) is the mechanism instituted to investigate 
specific products (product categories). By 2010, 4,885 
cases had been identified and investigation had been 
initiated in 1,678 cases.11 
China signed its first MRA with New Zealand, which has 
a very narrow scope as it concerns electric and electronic 
equipment and components, and works to the benefit 
of New Zealand producers. Before the agreement, New 
Zealand exporters had to test compliance with electrical 
safety and electromagnetic compatibility regulatory 
requirements on Chinese soil. There was uncertainty since 
no one could assure ex ante (before export) that products 
were indeed compatible with Chinese standards. Following 
signature of the MRA, New Zealand producers can affix the 
China Compulsory Certification (CCC) label on their goods 
before export from New Zealand. They can do so following 
accreditation and conformity assessment procedures 
carried out by New Zealand agencies formally accepted in 
China. One can easily see that uncertainty is eliminated in 
this way.  
There are also initiatives with wider content (i.e. that are 
not a priori limited to the examination of specific products) 
between heterogeneous players. The EU has chapters on 
regulatory cooperation in the successor agreements to the 
Lomé Convention with many of its African ex-colonies. They 
typically involve best endeavours clauses, however, with no 
binding obligations included therein (Horn et al. 2010).
 
8 See, Australian Government and New Zealand Government Productivity Commissions. 2012. Strengthening Trans-Tasman Economic Relations, www.
pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/australia-new-zealand/report
9 Recently consolidated and formalized under the auspices of the Transatlantic Business Council (TABC).
10 WTO Doc. G/TBT/W/348 of February 14, 2012. On TABD, see Quick (2008) who discusses the process in detail and shares this conclusion.
11 WTO Doc. G/TBT/W/348 of February 14, 2012.
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2.4. Clubs with Open Doors
And then there are clubs with open doors: WTO plurilateral 
agreements (PAs). Plurilateral agreements can be formed 
by a subset of the WTO membership, provided that the 
remaining WTO members have acquiesced to a demand 
to this effect. There is thus some ex ante control on 
their subject matter, and their subjection to voting by 
the membership is the means to ensure that any such 
arrangement is Pareto-sanctioned.12 They constitute 
yet another club approach to integration. However, 
their practical relevance to date has been limited to the 
liberalization of the government procurement market.  
Critical mass agreements (CMAs) constitute a negotiating 
technique to reduce the impact of free riding.13 Unlike 
plurilaterals, they have no institutional underpinning in the 
Agreement establishing the WTO. In the negotiations that 
led to the advent of the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA), for example, trading partners agreed that the eventual 
agreement would not enter into force unless a certain 
percentage of world production had first been covered. 
However, characterizing these initiatives as clubs is probably 
an exaggeration. CMAs have so far exhausted their 
usefulness in the negotiation of tariff reductions that have 
been multilateralized without non-participants being obliged 
to pay consideration.  
2.5. Task Force Focus
To honour its mandate, the Task Force proceeded in two 
steps. Two meetings were organized with a select group 
of experts where regulatory cooperation/coherence was 
discussed in a horizontal manner. The Task Force also 
commissioned think pieces authored by group members 
on select issues that were considered to deserve additional 
in-depth discussion. The main arguments of the think pieces 
are presented in Box 1 below.
It was stated supra that the concepts of regulatory 
cooperation and coherence are amorphous. The Task 
Force privileged a bottom-up approach, since a top-
down approach has innate limitations. Indeed, there is 
only so much one can do trying to define terms such 
as “regulatory cooperation,” precisely because its forms 
and variations can, in practice, be countless. Indeed, the 
OECD (2013) study referred to above, acknowledging this 
fact, refers to basic types of cooperation. Consequently, 
some aggregation is necessary for the discussion to be 
meaningful. Furthermore, top-down approaches are usually 
oblivious to the realist’s concerns. Realism is very much an 
issue in a policy-oriented endeavour.
The bottom-up approach had two legs. First, the business 
community and representatives of NGOs and international 
organizations were asked to come up with evidence 
where problems have arisen due to a lack of regulatory 
cooperation/coherence. This enquiry helped to better 
understand the problems posed by a lack of transparency, 
untimely cooperation, inadequate implementation and 
private standards. Second, representatives of the WTO 
and PTAs were invited to outline the current mandate for 
regulatory cooperation. Armed with this knowledge, a first 
shot was taken at the distance between the current and the 
desired level of cooperation. A select number of academics 
were then invited from various realms of expertise. This 
interaction allowed for a better feel regarding the original 
estimate of the distance, as well as a preliminary attempt at 
outlining recommendations.
12 Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015), and Lawrence (2006) discuss the relevance of plurilateral agreements in negotiating arrangements aiming to discipline 
NTBs. By “Pareto-sanctioned” we understand that at least one party is better off as a result of the advent of the new agreement while no one’s situation 
has deteriorated.
13 The free rider problem does not arise only in trade agreements. In 1931, seventeen nations signed the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which 
entered into force in 1935 (United States Treaties Series, 880). Seven more states adhered subsequently. Big whaling nations, like Germany and Japan, 
refused to sign the agreement. As a result, 43,000 whales were killed the year of the signature, with Germany and Japan able to profit from the lack of 
competition in this market. Today, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) has been in place since 1989 and counts 89 members. The free riding 
problem has substantially been reduced as a result. 
14 The think pieces are cited in the references and can be accessed at http://e15initiative.org/publications/. 
Box 1: Overview of E15 Think Pieces on Regulatory 
Systems Coherence
The selection of topics and authors responded to the 
need to blend into the process as much experience 
from ongoing regulatory cooperation as possible. The 
perspective is on trade, since the aim is to provide some 
input to the WTO regarding the manner in which it could 
better serve its current and anticipated workload. This 
trade perspective, however, is not exhausted within the 
confines of the current WTO mandate or regime. Indeed 
there are numerous initiatives (some of which are referred 
to above) focusing on regulatory cooperation that take 
place outside of the WTO, either formally within PTAs, or 
informally like the TACD. The think pieces cover a lot of 
this emerging picture.
It was also important to avoid “hothouse” analysis that 
might sound intellectually plausible but would stand no 
chance of implementation. The authors thus advanced 
options that could see the light of day without any need 
to move to a new multilateral institutional framework. 
All recommendations can take place within the current 
regime. With this in mind, we turn to a brief presentation 
of the think pieces.14
A. Arvius and Jachia: Regulatory Cooperation: A 
Wikihow
The authors provide a comprehensive presentation of 
different forms of regulatory cooperation and explain 
against this background the UN Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE) Recommendation L, which is a 
proposal for model regulatory cooperation. They also offer 
a case study to this effect.
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The focal point in Recommendation L is the concept 
of common regulatory objectives (CROs). CROs will 
be jointly drafted by regulators in a given sector and 
will address legitimate objectives such as public health 
and safety, environmental protection, etc. CROs will be 
defined with reference to international standards, when 
applicable, and will also contain references on conformity 
assessment. Finally, CROs will include surveillance 
mechanisms to ensure that agreements have been 
implemented.
EU experts will unavoidably see similarities between 
the EU “new approach” to harmonization and 
Recommendation L. There is one crucial difference, 
however, that makes Recommendation L easier to 
implement in environments with heterogeneous players 
like the WTO: it is bottom-up and not top-down like the 
EU.  
B. Bollyky: A Role for the World Trade Organization on 
Regulatory Coherence
Bollyky focuses on the institutional arrangements that can 
best promote regulatory cooperation within the WTO. He 
outlines the case for variable geometry, arguing that there 
is a role for the WTO, even though (in the short run at 
least) most of the activity will take place within clubs.15
  
He then assesses the pros and cons of the three clubs 
that are possible within the WTO, namely critical mass 
agreements, plurilateral agreements and preferential 
trade agreements. He argues that plurilateral agreements 
and CMAs are preferable over PTAs, if we want, 
while promoting regulatory cooperation, to sustain 
a tight umbilical cord between clubs and the WTO. 
Plurilaterals and CMAs can be issue-specific (which 
may be necessary on occasion to promote regulatory 
cooperation); they can promote transparency to a greater 
extent than PTAs; they might lead to less trade diversion; 
and they maintain the link to dispute settlement under 
the WTO. Nevertheless, those who engage in regulatory 
cooperation within PTAs can probably achieve more by 
continuing down this path.
What is the role for the WTO in all of this? The WTO will 
monitor progress made in the clubs and will upgrade to 
the multilateral level the issues of cooperation that can 
be multilateralized. Thus, transparency in the short term 
might lead to legally binding agreements in the medium-
to-long term, and the WTO will become the facilitator of 
the process and eventually the depositary institution for 
agreements.
C. Cattaneo: Promoting Greater Regulatory Coherence 
and Cooperation through Aid for Trade 
Cattaneo discusses Aid for Trade (AfT) and contemplates 
the manners in which this instrument can be used to 
promote regulatory cooperation.
The AfT initiative demonstrates a willingness to integrate 
laggards but a switch in focus may be warranted. In 
the author’s view, regulatory cooperation is important 
because of the ongoing “servicification” of manufacturing. 
Manufacturing is increasingly becoming global because 
of the emergence of global value chains (GVCs). 
Unavoidably, services inputs to manufacturing are 
becoming global as well. Services, however, are quite 
regulated and unless some cooperation is guaranteed the 
whole process risks being heavily burdened.
  
In order to facilitate cooperation, the distance between 
the “avant-garde” and laggards needs to be shortened. 
It is precisely in this context that AfT can be of help, were 
a change in focus agreed. Cattaneo suggests that AfT 
financing should privilege projects aiming to address, 
amongst others, competitiveness concerns within GVCs, 
investment, intellectual property, and the transfer of 
know-how.
D. Charnovitz: US Efforts to Ensure that Regulation 
Does Not Present Trade Barriers
Charnovitz looks closely at the manner in which the 
US has promoted regulatory cooperation over the 
years. The most decisive initiatives are those that have 
been undertaken in the second term of the Obama 
administration. Mechanisms have been adopted that 
will enable the US to assess the impact of its measures 
on trade, and also to review (and hopefully, eliminate) 
measures that it deems unnecessary (e.g. excessively 
restrictive) in order to reach stated objectives. The US 
wishes to promote a similar culture/approach across its 
(major) trading partners.
The US has moved towards establishing a framework 
for intensive regulatory cooperation with Canada and 
Mexico, which is unsurprising as the neighbouring 
countries are NAFTA partners. The US is developing a 
comparable framework with its transatlantic partners. 
Some de facto business-to-business cooperation has 
been consolidated in the Transatlantic Business Council. 
Ties have been developed between civil societies in the 
framework of the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue. And 
this is all happening while the TTIP has yet to see the light 
of day.  
15 This term variable geometry refers to an institutional setting where differentiated membership can participate in different agreements coming under 
the same roof. The EU offers a good example, where both the monetary union, as well as the enhanced cooperation, allows for a subset of the EU 
membership to go ahead and integrate in areas where other members might find it unwarranted. 
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E. Kauffmann and Malyshev: International Regulatory 
Cooperation: The Menu of Approaches
This is the first of two papers prepared by members 
of the OECD Secretariat (the second, being the paper 
authored by van Tongeren et al. discussed below). This 
paper focuses on a typology of regulatory cooperation 
that has been developed by the OECD (2013), as well as 
a discussion of the expected benefits (whereas the paper 
by van Tongeren et al. focuses on trade costs stemming 
from a lack of cooperation).
The paper classifies eleven forms of cooperation ranging 
from the most stringent (integration/harmonization 
through supranational institutions, citing the EU) 
to informal exchanges of information (such as the 
Transatlantic Dialogue discussed above). Between these 
two extremes, they categorize the following: specific 
negotiated agreements (e.g. international treaties); 
formal regulatory cooperation partnerships (e.g. Canada-
US Regulatory Cooperation Council); joint standard 
setting (OECD, WTO); trade agreements with regulatory 
provisions (e.g. modern PTAs); mutual recognition 
agreements; trans-governmental networks of regulators 
(e.g. International Laboratory Accreditation Corporation 
or ILAC, a forum that manages conformity assessment 
agreements signed by various accreditation bodies); 
unilateral convergence through good regulatory practices 
(e.g. TBT, Good Regulatory Practice); recognition and 
incorporation of international standards (e.g. ISO); and 
soft law principles and codes of conduct.
Gains from regulatory cooperation include not only 
economic gains but also mimicking better regulatory 
examples and capacity building. Countries willing to 
embark on this process will have to address domestic 
political economy concerns and be ready to face 
implementation costs. The choice of the intensity of 
cooperation will be function of a cost-benefit analysis.
F. Thorstensen, Weissinger and Sun: Private 
Standards: Implications for Trade, Development and 
Governance
The paper discusses the problems posed by the 
emergence of private standards. Its focus is on warning 
about the dangers entailed in a lack of cooperation, as 
private standards are developed by few players, without 
much negotiation within the WTO. The emergence of 
global value chains has contributed to the proliferation of 
private standards, since they are an appropriate manner 
for the transnational corporations (TNCs) that dominate 
GVCs to discipline the supply of inputs.
Developing countries in particular face an uphill battle, 
as they are requested to comply with TNC standards 
that they do not have to observe in the WTO framework, 
which, in their view, provides some guarantees that their 
interests will be safeguarded. The authors thus see a 
role for the WTO in this realm. Specifically, they would 
like discussions on private standards to move away from 
the current “fragmented” framework (where discussions 
take place in parallel in different WTO committees), and 
would further like the WTO to clarify the relevance of its 
own legal arsenal on private standards. They propose an 
elaborate five-step process that will enable stakeholders 
to reach a functional regulation of the issue. What matters 
is that participation in this process should not be solely 
reserved to the WTO, but opened to other institutions 
(such as the ISO) that have been active in the elaboration 
and adoption of standards.   
G. van Tongeren, Bastien and von Lampe: International 
Regulatory Cooperation, a Trade-Facilitating 
Mechanism
The authors approach the subject of regulatory 
cooperation as a sort of trade facilitation mechanism. In 
their view, the most promising type of cooperation should 
balance regulatory objectives with the means to achieve 
them and the impact on trade, with a combined positive 
net gain to society. 
They identify three categories of trade costs that the 
international community should address and aim 
to reduce: information costs (obtaining information 
about regulations); specification costs (complying 
with regulatory standards in the export market); and 
conformity assessment costs (relating to a demonstration 
of compliance with standards).  
They cite numerous empirical studies showing how 
cooperation mechanisms such as harmonization and/
or recognition can increase trade and facilitate allocative 
efficiency. Nevertheless, unilateral evaluation of the 
trade impact of regulations is the first, necessary 
step. Regulatory cooperation should be undertaken in 
circumstances that trigger a positive net benefit where the 
costs of maintaining domestic regulations are high.
H. Wijkström: The Third Pillar: Behind the Scenes, WTO 
Committee Work Delivers
The TBT Committee is widely hailed as an example 
of successful cooperation at the WTO. Wijkström lays 
out the terms of regulatory cooperation between WTO 
members in the TBT. The committee is a forum where 
both the regulatory and the trade communities meet 
and communicate. Many of the issues debated are of a 
technical nature and as a result it is quite often the case 
that both communities are simultaneously present in the 
room. They thus have the opportunity to understand each 
other’s concerns. The regulatory community is sensitized 
to the trade impact of regulations, whereas the trade 
community has the opportunity to be exposed to the 
rationale for trade-impacting regulations. Private sector 
engagement is essential to this work. 
Domestic coordination procedures (if effective) will 
ensure that the private sector—along with other 
stakeholders—exerts influence on positions taken at the 
WTO. Sometimes, because the composition of national 
delegations is the exclusive privilege of WTO members, 
it may be that the private sector (or other stakeholders) 
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is present through the delegation. The TBT Committee 
emerges as a genuine multilateral forum with 127 out of 
161 WTO members having already notified and debated 
regulation under the aegis of the TBT Agreement. 
Pragmatism is the driving force of the TBT Committee: 
it does not issue legally binding documents and it does 
not have a specific mandate to resolve disputes with 
the WTO imprimatur. And yet it manages to agree 
on procedures and to significantly contribute to the 
understanding of national policies (and thus, set aside 
potential disputes). Currently, WTO members continue 
to work on guidance aimed at avoiding unnecessary 
obstacles to trade; referred to as Good Regulatory 
Practice (see above).
I. Wolfe: How Can We Know (More) About the Trade 
Effects of Regulation?
Wolfe insists on the role that transparency is called to 
play. He does not deny that substantial progress has 
been made at the WTO on this score, but argues that 
there is still much room for improvement. He prioritizes 
improvements in two areas:
 – He underscores that the measurement of trade effects 
of regulation is an area of revealed interest for WTO 
members. Otherwise, why include the legal discipline 
on necessity? And yet, the “culture” of measurement 
has not made much headway. Panels for a start, by 
understanding the obligations assumed as guarantee 
for equality of competitive conditions in the future, 
have stopped short from using “trade effects” as 
a proxy to decide whether non-discrimination (the 
basic GATT/WTO discipline) has been adhered to. 
Wolfe points to sector-specific work that has been 
done outside the WTO, which could be of relevance. 
He cites, for example, the OECD Services Trade 
Restrictiveness Index, which estimates the effects of 
regulation on trade in services.
 – He revisits previous work on transparency, which 
led many to conclude that WTO members often 
lack the incentives to be transparent as they may be 
offering private and self-incriminating information. 
He thus sees more of a role for the WTO Secretariat, 
the “common agent.” This could be done through 
several existing mechanisms (e.g. the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism), but new initiatives could also be 
designed. An obvious starting point is transparency 
regarding regulatory activity within PTAs. A lot is 
happening, as discussed supra, and there is at best 
uncertainty regarding what they should be reporting 
following multilateral review of notified PTAs by WTO 
bodies.
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3. Policy Options: From 
Current to Desired Cooperation
The policy options recommended in this paper aim to cover 
(as much as possible of) the distance between the current 
level of cooperation at the WTO-level and at the PTA-level, 
and the desired level of regulatory cooperation. 
As can be seen from the discussion so far, the paper (and 
the process behind its deliberations and conclusions) 
aims to bring together two communities that (alas) are 
not in close communication—namely, the trade and 
regulatory communities. In principle, the former cares about 
addressing trade barriers, whereas the latter does not 
have trade in mind when evaluating appropriate responses 
to address distortions. And yet, the distinction between 
“domestic” and “trade” concerns seems increasingly 
artificial. The liberalization of investment, cross-border 
vertical integration, and the emergence of global value 
chains have contributed towards shortening the distance 
between the two communities. Some noteworthy initiatives 
by the US Obama administration are evidence of this trend, 
and we will return to this issue in what follows.  
It should be underscored upfront that the objective is 
to design solutions that can find application across the 
board, and not simply between a set of homogeneous 
players. Ideally, the WTO should try to accommodate both 
multilateral and plurilateral deals among a subset of its 
membership. However, the old “battle of –isms” should 
not be renewed, where multilateralism was idolized and 
regionalism was demonized. Over 500 FTAs later, those who 
fought this battle should be conceding defeat, at least as far 
as pragmatic trade cooperation is concerned. 
This is not to say that PTAs (and clubs in general) do not 
give rise to (new) issues to tackle. In a world where tariffs 
are becoming irrelevant, and it is regulatory barriers that 
segment markets, the problems are of a different, milder 
order. After all, regulation must observe the TBT and 
SPS disciplines discussed above, and among them non-
discrimination. Clubs are facilitating deals between those 
willing to commit. Outsiders (who are WTO members) can 
live in the safety (to the extent that it is state behaviour 
that is being disciplined) that they can access clubs on 
conditions that are identical to those the original insiders had 
to observe.  
Homogeneity of participants is a contributing factor towards 
ensuring regulatory cooperation. This is why the most 
far-reaching schemes of regulatory cooperation that we 
observe—either formal (e.g. RCC) or informal (e.g. TABD)—
are between homogeneous players. A key challenge 
for the multilateral trading system will be to ensure that 
such schemes keep the WTO umbilical cord intact while 
introducing mechanisms that will facilitate an eventual 
multilateralization of effective regulatory cooperation within 
clubs. We will return to this issue infra.     
As stated, since this is a policy exercise, proposals must 
exhibit a substantial dose of realism. There is often a 
trade-off between selection of the first best instrument and 
realism, in that first best instruments could be costly or 
simply politically undesirable. The recommendations seek 
to walk along this tightrope without sacrificing too much in 
either direction.
With this in mind, the recommendations are divided into 
“institutional” and “substantive” categories. The former 
are dedicated to issues regarding who participates in the 
discussion, under what conditions, etc. The latter focus 
on a selection of issues that have captured the minds 
and attention of the trade and regulatory communities. 
They concern the improvement of existing obligations and 
mechanisms for regulatory cooperation.
3.1. Institutional Recommendations
3.1.1. Clubs
The single undertaking framework has been applied with 
considerable success during the Uruguay Round but not so 
during the Doha Round. Clubs are becoming inevitable.
The GATT was successful in dismantling tariff barriers, with 
a number of exceptions still in place. The WTO has since 
managed to complete one additional tariff agreement (the 
ITA, the second version of which was reached in July 2015). 
It has also concluded two agreements: one dealing with 
deadweight loss (the Trade Facilitation Agreement) and the 
other with trade and development (Aid for Trade). However, 
it has so far proven impossible to conclude multilateral 
agreements on “pure” regulatory issues. Meanwhile, 
agreements covering regulatory matters are routinely 
negotiated between subgroups of the WTO membership, 
overwhelmingly in the context of PTAs. Since it is regulatory 
barriers that segment markets today, recourse to this type 
of arrangement will, in all likelihood, not diminish.  
As noted, we observe at an empirical level intense regulatory 
cooperation mainly among like-minded players. This should 
not come as surprise. WTO membership resembles the 
United Nations; it is composed of different players with 
different social preferences drawn from different cultural 
backgrounds and different levels of development. This 
amalgamation of participants who do not share the same 
concerns or priorities makes consensus difficult to achieve.
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The WTO should rethink its attitude towards variable 
geometry. The promotion of PAs and CMAs (ahead of 
PTAs) should figure high on the agenda. At the same time, 
some form of cooperation (in terms of consultation and 
transparency for example) should continue to take place on 
a multilateral basis.
The contribution of PAs could be meaningful in the 
regulatory arena. It would appear that fewer concerns are 
raised by PAs dealing with new issues than subjects that are 
already covered by the WTO. The Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA) remained a PA after the Uruguay Round 
because procurement is explicitly excluded from the reach 
of Article III of GATT (national treatment) and Article XIII.1 of 
GATS—although, in contrast to the GATT, GATS calls for 
negotiations on the procurement of services to be launched 
two years after entry into force of the agreement (i.e. 1997).
The GPA precedent suggests that one rationale or function 
of PAs could be as an instrument to allow WTO members 
to deal with issues that are not (yet) covered by the 
WTO—any disciplines that are agreed among a subset 
of countries will not undercut existing commitments as 
there are none. Article III.8 of GATT explicitly excludes 
government procurement from the obligation to observe 
national treatment. By signing the GPA and agreeing to 
national treatment between them, a few WTO members 
moved into an area not covered by the WTO mandate. In a 
similar vein, one could imagine PAs in the area of investment 
protection, coordination of monetary policies, etc. PAs 
could of course also be signed in areas already covered by 
the WTO mandate should a few members wish to move 
further and faster. An example is the recent suggestion by 
some countries to negotiate PAs on services or on trade 
facilitation. 
The possibilities on the regulatory front are endless. The 
WTO is a negative integration regime, where domestic 
policies are designed unilaterally and must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner. There is thus the potential for 
cooperation among like-minded countries in various areas, 
while keeping the door open to future accessions.
One more issue is worth mentioning here. From a WTO 
(multilateral) perspective, there is an obvious advantage 
when recourse is made to PAs as opposed to PTAs. 
Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015) advance a series of 
arguments explaining why PAs keep the umbilical cord to 
the multilateral system tight. Since, for the reasons outlined 
above, recourse to clubs is necessary in order to dismantle 
regulatory barriers, it is in the interest of the WTO to monitor 
what is happening within this realm. Monitoring will be 
facilitated if PAs are preferred over PTAs.  
The WTO should become some sort of “osmosis 
mechanism” that will select the issues or agreements at the 
plurilateral level that could be multilateralized.   
Policy Option 1: The WTO should actively promote 
regulatory cooperation within clubs and develop 
mechanisms that enable the multilateralization of clubs-
only agreements. In this respect, the establishment of PAs 
should be sanctioned unless WTO members representing 
a combined threshold of world trade (e.g. 20%) block it. 
The WTO should particularly encourage PAs that deal with 
issues that do not come under the existing mandate.  
3.1.2. Easier access for business 
A consistent grievance expressed by business is that it does 
not have easy access to the various WTO committees. Its 
concerns are not heard and as a result policies that are 
supposed to regulate business behaviour are designed 
without any input from the most interested stakeholder.
The access of business to the WTO is of course a function 
of the persuasive power of lobbies, since lobbies must 
convince their national governments about the legitimacy of 
their concerns. They can participate in WTO deliberations 
only through them, as the WTO is a state-to-state contract. 
For some business interests of a transnational nature and 
they might find it even harder to persuade one specific 
government. 
In EC-Bananas III, the Appellate Body held that WTO 
members could choose the composition of their delegation. 
Thus, in principle it is up to individual WTO members 
to decide whether they want to give voice to business 
concerns. This has proven to be manifestly inadequate. The 
WTO should take the initiative of inviting business interests 
to participate when regulatory issues of concern to their 
operations are being addressed. Transnational business 
interests can prove to be an ally to the WTO in its quest 
to combat unnecessary, excessive regulation. The easiest 
way to achieve this is through an extension of the observer 
status to business representatives. 
It is true that business participation is asymmetric across 
the various WTO committees. This is a function of various 
factors ranging from business interest in the work of a 
particular committee to government (un)willingness to 
reveal its preferences. It is also true that the TBT and SPS 
Committees rank among the WTO committees with the 
most intense participation of business representatives. The 
efforts of these two committees should be commended 
and improved. The continued relevance of the WTO in trade 
matters also hinges on its relevance to business interests.  
Policy Option 2: Business interests should be in a position 
to continue voicing their concerns, especially in the TBT 
and SPS Committees, where they should participate as 
observers. Their participation should be encouraged and 
requests for observer status should not be refused except 
for compelling reasons to be agreed and transparently 
communicated. In designing this observer status, the WTO 
could be inspired by the “Industry Advisory Committee” 
of the OECD or the “Business Advisory Council” of APEC. 
Participation of business interests should not be confined to 
areas covered by the TBT and SPS Agreements. It should 
occur in all areas coming under the aegis of the WTO, 
with priority given to services trade. A “Business Advisory 
Council” in the WTO could usefully see the light of day in this 
context.
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3.2. Substantive Recommendations
3.2.1. Transparency 
Transparency obligations in the TBT and SPS Agreements 
are the most far-reaching in the WTO regime. One-stop 
shops, enquiry points, intervals between the preparation and 
adoption of measures coming under the aegis of the two 
agreements constitute important innovations. Regulation, 
however, extends to areas not covered by the TBT and 
SPS Agreements, and the first substantive recommendation 
would be to consolidate all such innovations in one new 
provision (or agreement) on transparency.
The TBT Information Management System informs that 
19,723 notifications of measures had been recorded at 
the time of writing. The number is impressive, and yet the 
discussions and think pieces behind this paper lead to the 
conclusion that improvements are still possible.
Transparency alone is a factor that decisively contributes 
to reducing the magnitude of trade friction. Take for 
example the case of specific trade concerns mentioned in 
introduction. According to the official WTO website, 460 
STCs had been raised by July 2015. A healthy percentage 
(more than one-fifth of the total) concerned requests for 
clarifications regarding national measures. The fact that 
a very small percentage of STCs have become formal 
disputes (five cases can qualify as quintessentially TBT 
disputes) suggests that additional transparency has helped 
remove concerns regarding the function of national TBT 
measures.
There are three areas where improvements to the current 
transparency obligation can be achieved. First, what should 
the membership be transparent about? Second, when 
should the transparency obligation kick in? Third, how much 
information should be provided?
Transparency should cover projects of laws, final measures 
and amended measures. Information should also be 
provided on alternatives that could usefully help regulators 
reach the stated outcome, as well as on the trade impact of 
the adopted measure. Regulators should explain alternatives 
that they have (eventually) dismissed, but they should 
also be prepared to hear about the efficacy of alternative 
measures that they had not contemplated and explain why 
they might consider them inappropriate for use in their 
country.
There is a very important first step here. Often we do not 
know where the problems lie. Hence, a natural preliminary 
stage would be for regulation to be transparent. And, of 
course, part of this discussion concerns a mapping of the 
current situation. There is sometimes a lack of knowledge 
regarding the regulatory process of even the most advanced 
democracies that are WTO members. There are often 
unused opportunities and a lack of information regarding 
national transparency mechanisms. 
This is an area where work could usefully be done working 
from both sides of the equation: the supply and demand 
of information. The idea would be to map the overlap and 
assess what can be done with respect to whatever is left 
out.
Business consistently complains about “unhelpful” 
transparency—e.g. the notification of measures that 
have already entered into force. Coglianese (2009) 
usefully distinguishes between “fishbowl” and “reasoned” 
transparency. The first term focuses on the release of 
information that can document how government officials 
actually behave, such as by disclosing meetings. But there 
is another type of transparency, reasoned transparency, 
which demands that government officials offer explicit 
explanations for their actions. Sound explanations will be 
based on the application of normative principles to the facts 
and evidence accumulated by decision-makers, and will 
show why an alternative course of action may have been 
rejected. It is the latter form of transparency that could be 
helpful to address business industry concerns. 
There is an additional element to consider: the outcome 
is (largely) influenced by political economy, especially in 
democracies. Absent internationalized investment, lobbies 
represent domestic players only. If transparency comes at 
a stage when everything has been decided, then foreign 
interests will simply not be taken into account. 
The involvement of affected parties at an early stage, 
coupled with an obligation to explain national measures, 
are important improvements to a mere obligation to sterile 
transparency, which is usually exhausted in the requirement 
to publish laws and/or notify them at the WTO. 
There is a very important twist here. “Affected parties” 
should not be understood as only the business community. 
It is important to recall that two communities need to 
come together in the process: the trade and regulatory 
communities. Regulation affects citizens at large. Its 
spokesperson is civil society in its various shapes and 
forms. Transparency should be all-inclusive; it should aim 
to implicate all interested stakeholders in the process. This 
obviously takes, properly speaking, an internal and not an 
international trade dimension. It is nonetheless a step that 
we recommend since it is by all means appropriate and it 
will have a positive effect on discussions related to trade. 
The trade dimension of regulations will be de-mystified and 
trade sceptics will understand that the influence the WTO 
regime exercises on domestic regulatory processes is both 
measured and heading in the right direction.
To some extent, the current regime does address these 
concerns. First, according to the existing TBT Agreement, 
all WTO members must guarantee an interval between 
publication and entry into force. There are complaints, 
nonetheless, that this is not fully observed. Second, the TBT 
Committee has been quite active in proposing initiatives 
such as the guidelines for Good Regulatory Practice aiming 
to improve the quality of regulatory interventions among 
WTO members. Similar initiatives should be encouraged. 
More specifically, to ensure that sufficient time is allocated 
to foreign interests to adjust to new realities, the use of 
one-stop shops should be encouraged. Traders should not 
spend time gathering information about the place where 
information will be provided. Furthermore, the interval 
between publication and entry into force should not be 
unduly restrictive.
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Another way to improve the current system is to oblige 
regulators to follow certain procedural steps before 
measures enter into force. Specifically, these would include 
the obligation to provide: the rationale for intervention 
(reasoned as opposed to fishbowl transparency); a 
preliminary assessment of the expected trade impact of 
proposed measures (this will result in closer interaction 
between the regulatory and trade communities of the 
intervening WTO member—US practice in this area could 
serve as benchmark); written explanation as to how 
alternative measures were taken into consideration before 
selecting the proposed method; and responses to questions 
raised by interested parties (while allowing civil society, 
the business community and WTO members to act as 
observers with the possibility to enquire).  
Policy Option 3: The current transparency obligation must 
be consolidated and further strengthened in five directions: 
(i) there should be a “mapping” of national mechanisms 
that are intended to provide transparency with respect to 
national regulatory processes; (ii) WTO members should 
notify all adopted measures, whether based on international 
standards or not; (iii) they should explain the rationale behind 
their measures (“reasoned transparency”); (iv) they should 
involve affected parties at an early stage in the process; (v) 
they should use the reasonable interval between publication 
and entry into force of a measure to fine-tune regulation 
so that it represents a balanced trade-off between genuine 
regulatory concerns and an effort to minimize the resulting 
trade impact. It bears repetition that this proposal is not 
limited to trade in goods.
3.2.2. Assessing the trade impact of regulations
Ex ante assessment of the trade impact of regulation is 
a helpful, and very noteworthy, accomplishment of the 
Obama administration. It is not unheard of, however, that 
such assessments may overestimate or underestimate 
certain correlations with other factors that also influence the 
trade outcome. It is thus always useful to accompany these 
exercises with an ex post assessment of the trade impact of 
a measure.
The initiative to conduct ex post assessments should not be 
entrusted (at least not exclusively) to the original regulator 
(the same could also be said for the ex ante assessment). 
The idea would be to produce credible evidence regarding 
the operation of the measure that is being assessed. 
Stakeholders could then compare original expectations with 
actual practice. This type of information could provide a 
useful input not only to redesign (if needed) the concerned 
measure, it could also be valuable for similar future 
measures, as stakeholders would be in better position to 
evaluate their operation. 
 
This recommendation might prove to be an uphill battle for 
developing countries with limited administrative capacities. 
To overcome this hurdle, the more advanced bureaucracies 
should be prepared to share their experiences and engage 
in training and capacity building. This is where existing 
WTO mechanisms such as the AfT initiative can contribute 
towards enhancing the level of regulatory dialogue between 
WTO members. 
Policy Option 4: The original ex ante assessment of the 
impact of a proposed regulation should be accompanied 
by an ex post assessment of the trade impact of adopted 
measures. To the extent that discrepancies between the 
expected outcome and the observed impact exist, national 
administrations could revise their a priori assumptions so as 
to design more efficient regulations in the future.
3.2.3. Encourage the implementation of international 
standards
The preceding discussion has established that transparency 
emerges as a key issue. Notwithstanding the high number 
of notifications, WTO members might not always have an 
incentive to be transparent about their policies. Standard-
setting organizations (SSOs) have the opposite incentive, 
i.e. to be transparent. Indeed, by construct, the credibility of 
institutions in setting “world” standards heavily relies on their 
“inclusivity” and the power of persuasion that they indeed 
design standards for the world. Moreover, from a purely legal 
perspective, unless they are all-inclusive their output will not 
be recognized by the WTO.16 The adoption of international 
standards will thus contribute to transparency.
Transparency is obviously not the only reason why the 
use of international standards should be encouraged. As 
mentioned, regulatory diversity is in and of itself a market 
segmentation factor. This paper evidently does not argue 
for a totally deregulated world in order to promote trade 
liberalization. Regulation solves problems; and the manner in 
which various problems are solved not only differs, but may 
also need to differ in light of the differentiated conditions that 
exist around the world. A country with a well-funded and 
professional regulatory apparatus may be in a position to 
tackle problems that another country simply cannot remedy. 
Furthermore, societies have distinct values, preferences and 
16 In 2000, the TBT Committee adopted a decision to this effect (G/TBT/9, of 13 November 2000). The Appellate Body has recognized in its report on US-
Tuna II (Mexico) the legal relevance of this decision, holding that it is a subsequent agreement in the Vienna Convention sense of the term, which practically 
means that judges must refer to it when deciding whether a standard is “international,” and hence recourse to it is in principle compulsory as per Art. 2.4 
TBT (§372). The Decision’s §7 is entitled “Openness” and reads:
Any interested member of the international standardizing body, including especially developing country members, with an interest in a specific 
standardization activity should be provided with meaningful opportunities to participate at all stages of standard development. It is noted that with 
respect to standardizing bodies within the territory of a WTO Member that have accepted the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption 
and Application of Standards by Standardizing Bodies (Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement) participation in a particular international standardization activity 
takes place, wherever possible, through one delegation representing all standardizing bodies in the territory that have adopted, or expected to adopt, 
standards for the subject-matter to which the international standardization activity relates. This is illustrative of the importance of participation in the 
international standardizing process accommodating all relevant interests.
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fears, all of which can lead to diverse regulatory approaches 
to address similar concerns. It is thus not only political 
economy but also the public interest that drives regulation 
across sovereignties in different parts of the world.
International standards offer a process where the influence 
of (domestic) political economy, while respecting different 
values, can be tamed. Thus, transaction costs are reduced 
between those subscribing to the same standard.17 
Current TBT and SPS disciplines require recourse to 
standards to the extent that they are appropriate in light of 
the objective pursued by WTO members. There is room for 
improvement in two respects.
First, the notion of “international standard” should be 
clarified. The TBT Agreement mentions only in passing the 
ISO (one of the SSOs). Even the SPS Agreement—which 
does mention three SSOs whose output can be equated 
to “international standards”—contains an indicative list 
of SSOs, leaving it to the panels to decide on this issue. 
The 2000 Decision is a step in the right direction, but 
probably not a sufficient one, since it leaves a lot of room 
for discretion on the part of panels to decide whether a 
standard is international. Were one to take into account the 
institutional design of these panels (in the majority of cases 
composed of non-experts in this specific area), it becomes 
obvious that there is a strong argument in favour of limiting 
discretion upfront. To this effect, an indicative list of SSOs 
would be helpful.
Second, the allocation of the burden (production) of proof 
as decided by the Appellate Body in EC-Sardines might 
act as an incentive to neglect international standards where 
they could have been appropriately used. In this case, 
the WTO organ decided that plaintiffs carry the burden to 
demonstrate that a national measure is consistent with an 
international standard, irrespective of whether the regulating 
WTO member has deviated from an international standard 
or not.18 This case law has been reproduced verbatim 
in all subsequent cases. Various authors have criticized 
this approach on different grounds. Of interest to the 
present discussion is the following: a reversal of case law 
will contribute towards the increased use of international 
standards, since those willing to deviate will have to be 
prepared to carry the associated burden of proof.   
Finally, this point should not be understood as the 
endorsement of a race for the full harmonization of all 
preferences, far from it. Harmonization makes sense under 
a particular set of conditions—e.g. the presence of network 
externalities (when the value of a product or service is 
dependent on the number of persons using it). It would of 
course be far more preferable to strive for other integration 
instruments such as recognition. Recommendation L 
that we have detailed supra could be of relevance in this 
context and could enable cooperation at larger scale. As 
stated, however, such instruments require trust with regards 
future activities, which is hard to imagine between unlike 
players. Harmonization, on the other hand, requires the 
implementation of agreed norms, nothing more. 
Further, harmonization should be expected to occur where 
gains from cooperation are clear and present. After all, it is 
private operators that drive much of the process behind the 
best known and established SSOs.
Policy Option 5: Article 2.4 of TBT (and article 3.1 of SPS) 
could be further strengthened. Besides encouraging the 
use of international standards in principle, it could make it 
clear that deviations from international standards should be 
justified by the deviating state. The same provision(s) should 
be enriched in two ways: through an explicit reference of the 
2000 Decision and through the addition of an indicative list 
of SSOs.
3.2.4. Private standards
Private standards have mushroomed over recent years. We 
live in a world full of standards but not in a standardized 
world. For developing countries, which are typically 
“takers” of standards, this phenomenon has added to 
existing transaction costs. Furthermore, they represent an 
increasingly important hindrance for those willing to jump on 
the bandwagon of GVCs.
As things stand, there is a very high degree of uncertainty 
as to whether private standards are disciplined by the WTO. 
And the fact that (complaints notwithstanding) no one has 
yet to initiate a dispute on this score is the best proof that 
the common view is that they lie outside the perimeters of 
the organization. A series of discussions have taken place 
in the TBT and SPS Committees, with members unable to 
bridge their differences.
Those who pay the price regarding the proliferation of 
private standards would like to see some harmonized 
solution to the issue, with the WTO emerging as a natural 
forum. Otherwise, it is asymmetric national laws that apply, 
which could (or could not) provide for transparency, effective 
consumer protection, antitrust liability, and so on.     
Policy Option 6: The WTO should concentrate on private 
standards by dedicating one forum to address the issue. 
The WTO could be inspired by prior endeavours, such 
as the 1971 Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, 
which was established to clarify GATT law with respect to 
taxes that could lawfully be adjusted in a trade transaction. 
Instead of continuing along the current top-down approach 
(i.e. what is a private standard?), which has so far led 
nowhere, it would probably be more opportune to dedicate 
to sector-specific negotiations and try to extrapolate 
elements from prior successful experience to the new 
sectors under discussion. 
17 National regulations must be based on international standards. In its very recent report on India-Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body held that 
this wording allows for some discretion by implementing national authorities, which, nevertheless, cannot put into question the quintessential elements of 
international standards.
18 In presence of an international standard, the European Union (defendant) had decided to adopt its own measure, which was not consistent with the 
international standard. The question that arose was who should justify the deviation? Against all odds, the Appellate Body decided that it should be Peru, 
the complaining party, and not the defendant. The Appellate Body did not even pay lip service to the fact that it could be for reasons of private information 
that the defendant had decided to deviate. It held that the various transparency requirements embedded in the TBT Agreement allowed Peru to have a 
good idea about the reasons for deviation, and allocated the burden of proof accordingly.
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A very appropriate way to rationalize the quality of regulatory 
interventions at home is by looking at the best examples 
elsewhere and mimic them. Increased transparency at the 
WTO in the manner presented in this paper will be a decisive 
step in this direction. Reasoned transparency, as described 
above, should become a priority for the WTO. It is through 
this mechanism that the trade and the regulatory community 
will be brought around the same table. Bringing these two 
communities under one roof should become one of the 
WTO pillars as the organization continues to strive towards 
integrating markets predominantly segmented through non-
tariff barriers.
What should be the next steps in this endeavour? We have 
stated early on in this study that all our proposals are armed 
with a heavy dose of realism. Viewed from this perspective, 
it would not matter if we started from Policy Option 2 or 
6. What we would not like to see, though, is the forest 
sacrificed for the tree. To be clear, we would like to see 
an institutional innovation that would promote regulatory 
cooperation across the WTO membership on a sustainable 
basis. “Functionalist” approaches have worked well in 
various fora, and it is for this reason that we encourage 
the current initiatives undertaken in the context of the TBT 
and SPS Committees. There is no reason, nevertheless, 
to restrict such initiatives to issues covered only by the 
TBT and SPS Agreements. They should be reproduced 
elsewhere, and they should also be improved.    
Alternatively, the WTO could envisage establishing a 
Working Group on Transparency where all our proposals 
could find a home for debate and deliberation. Every once 
in a while, economists point to new gains from market 
integration. For the world community to reap these gains 
it needs to understand the reasons for intervention in 
the first place, evaluate the different attempts to regulate 
comparable or even similar issues, and promote the 
most efficient solutions. Membership in this endeavour 
may vary depending on various factors. The WTO should 
provide the common roof. It should add a function akin 
to an Information Exchange regime before designing new 
disciplines on non-tariff barriers.
4. Final Remarks and Next 
Steps
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Annex 1: Summary Table of Main Policy Options
Policy Option The Current Situation What Needs to Change
Institutional Recommendations
1. The WTO should promote 
recourse to plurilateral 
agreements, especially in areas 
of regulatory cooperation not 
covered by the current WTO 
mandate.
It should increase the flow of 
transparency from clubs (PAs, PTAs) 
to the WTO.
Article X.9 of the Agreement 
establishing the WTO requires 
consensus voting by the WTO 
membership for a PA to be added to 
the WTO legal arsenal. 
The provision needs to change in two 
respects:
1) Instead of consensus, PAs should 
be added unless WTO members 
representing 20% of world trade 
opposes them
2) An encouragement should be added 
that PAs focus on areas not covered 
by the current WTO mandate, e.g. 
investment protection, trade facilitation 
for services, etc.
2. The WTO should open up to 
business interests, especially to 
transnational business that might 
find it hard to press its views 
through one WTO member. 
Nothing in the current legal design 
stops WTO members from adding 
business representatives to their 
delegation. Nothing, however, 
guarantees that business interests will 
be represented either. 
The Industry Advisory Committee of 
the OECD and the Business Advisory 
Council of APEC can provide the 
blueprint for a WTO opening to 
representation of business interests to 
the various WTO committees.
Participation of business interests 
should not be confined to areas 
covered by the TBT and SPS 
Agreements.
Substantive Recommendations
3. Transparency disciplines must be 
strengthened and consolidated.
Transparency is discussed in various 
agreements in a scattered manner. 
It requires publication of measures 
coming under the agreement at hand, 
interval between adoption and entry 
into force of measures (under the aegis 
of the TBT and SPS), and enquiry 
points where explanations regarding 
national measures will be provided.
1) Transparency-related obligations 
should be consolidated in one 
agreement.
2) WTO members should be required 
to provide ex ante evaluations of the 
trade impact of their regulation, and 
observe “reasoned transparency” – i.e. 
provide explanations about measures 
to be adopted.
3) Both business interests and civil 
society at large should be implicated 
early on in the process, before final 
decisions have been taken.
4) The aim of transparency should be 
to bring together the regulatory and the 
trade community.
4. WTO members should be 
required to perform ex post 
evaluations of the trade impact 
of measures adopted, and make 
the necessary adjustments when 
warranted.
There is nothing to this effect in the 
current agreements coming under the 
aegis of the WTO.
A new provision to this effect needs to 
be introduced.
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5. Recourse to international 
standards should be encouraged.
Article 2.4 of TBT and Article 3.1 of 
SPS request from WTO members to 
base their measures on international 
standards, when appropriate. 
The two provisions should be modified 
so as to:
1) Oblige WTO members to also notify 
their measures based on international 
standards;
2) In case of deviation from an 
international standard, it is the deviating 
WTO member that should carry the 
burden of proof for doing so;
3) The 2000 Decision should be added 
to the two agreements and should be 
observed by WTO members; 
4) An indicative list of SSOs should be 
added.
6. The relevance of the WTO on 
private standards should be 
clarified.
There is an ongoing discussion 
regarding private standards that has 
led nowhere.
The WTO should establish a forum with 
immediate effect (such as the Working 
Party on Border Tax Adjustments) that 
will clarify the legal relevance of the 
WTO TBT/SPS Agreements on private 
standards. Ideally, private standards 
should come under the aegis of the 
two agreements.
Instead of continuing along the current 
top-down approach, it would be more 
opportune to focus on sector-specific 
negotiations and try to extrapolate 
elements from prior successful 
experiences to the new sectors under 
discussion.
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